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Abstract: 
This paper explores how ‘ice’ is woven into the spaces and practices of the 
state in Norway and Canada and, specifically, how representations of the 
sea ice edge become political agents in that process. We focus in particular 
on how these states have used science to ‘map’ sea ice – both graphically 
and legally – over the past decades. This culminated with two maps 
produced in 2015, a Norwegian map that moved the Arctic sea ice edge 70 
km northward and a Canadian map that moved it 200 km southward. Using 
the maps and their genealogies to explore how designations of sea ice are 
entangled with political objectives (oil drilling in Norway, sovereignty 
claims in Canada), we place the maps within the more general tendency of 
states to assign fixed categories to portions of the earth’s surface and 
define distinct lines between them. We propose that the production of 
static ontologies through cartographic representations becomes particularly 
problematic in an icy environment of extraordinary temporal and spatial 
dynamism, where complex ocean-atmospheric processes and their 
biogeographic impacts are reduced to lines on a map. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper explores how ‘ice’ is woven into the spaces and practices of the state 
in Norway and Canada and, specifically, how representations of the sea ice edge 
become political agents in that process. We focus in particular on how these 
states have used science to ‘map’ sea ice – both graphically and legally – over the 
past decades. This culminated with two maps produced in 2015, a Norwegian 
map that moved the Arctic sea ice edge 70 km northward and a Canadian map 
that moved it 200 km southward. Using the maps and their genealogies to 
explore how designations of sea ice are entangled with political objectives (oil 
drilling in Norway, sovereignty claims in Canada), we place the maps within the 
more general tendency of states to assign fixed categories to portions of the 
earth’s surface and define distinct lines between them. We propose that the 
production of static ontologies through cartographic representations becomes 
particularly problematic in an icy environment of extraordinary temporal and 
spatial dynamism, where complex ocean-atmospheric processes and their 
biogeographic impacts are reduced to lines on a map.  
 
Introduction 
 
“We are not moving the ice edge. It is actually nature that is currently moving the 
ice edge.”   
-- Erna Solberg, Prime Minister of Norway (Solberg 2015)1 
Page 1 of 45 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 2
 
“Presto! More ice, just in time for an election. Gosh, even Mother Nature has been 
cowed into co-operating with [Canadian Prime Minister Stephen] Harper’s 
ambitions.”  
– ‘Rogue Chimp’, online comment (Semeniuk 2015) 
 
On 20 January 2015, the Government of Norway released a new map of its 
northern waters (Figure 1). The map quickly became a topic of national debate 
because it moved the location of the southern edge of sea ice northward by some 
70 km, in comparison with an equivalent map that was issued in a report that 
had been commissioned by the Government of Norway in 2003. The new map 
had significant implications for Norway’s all-important offshore oil and gas 
industry because Norway’s Lofoten-Barents Sea Management Plan prohibits oil 
exploration in a number of environmentally sensitive zones, including  ‘areas 
along the edge of the marginal ice zone and the polar front’ (Ministry of the 
Environment 2011, 138). Following the release of the new map, critics and 
supporters of petrochemical development alike were quick to note that, with the 
ice edge’s northward shift, the entire Southeast Barents Sea Offshore Oil 
Province was now open for development. Indeed, environmentalists suspected 
that it was hardly a coincidence that the new map was released on the same day 
that Norway opened new Barents Sea exploration blocks for competitive bidding. 
Lars Haltbrekken, Chairman of Friends of the Earth Norway, charged that the 
new map was part of a relentless oil politics in the Barents Sea, where ‘anything 
is done to please an industry belonging to the past’ (Norwegian News Agency 
2015a), a position echoed by marine biologists and oceanographers (Norwegian 
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News Agency 2015b; Sundby 2015) as well as opposition politicians (Andersen 
2015, Bjørndal 2016). It was in response to such assertions that Prime Minister 
Solberg made the statement quoted at the beginning of this article, defending the 
policy change as a mandate from ‘nature’. 
 
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
Just three months after the release of the Norwegian map, the 
Government of Canada published a revised version of its Atlas of Canada. The 
atlas’ national map of Canada (Figure 2) also depicted the edge of sea ice. 
However, in contrast with the Norwegian map, the Canadian map moved the ice 
edge about 200km southward in comparison with the previous national atlas, 
which had been published in 2006 (Figure 3). The redrawing to indicate more ice 
is counterintuitive, given that between 1979 and 2012 Arctic sea ice extent 
decreased at a rate of 3.5 to 4.1% per decade (.45 to .51 million km2 per decade) 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013, 319). The politics behind the 
new Canadian map are not entirely clear. Some, including geographer Robert 
McLeman, speculated that the depiction on the 2015 map was an act of 
cartographic ‘fakery’ that reflected Prime Minister Harper’s scepticism about 
climate change (Kwong 2015), an opinion that echoed popular reactions to the 
map illustrated by the online comment by ‘Rogue Chimp’ at the beginning of this 
article. Others, including Canadian Ice Service forecaster Denis Dubé, countered 
that the shift was due to a well-intentioned change in methodology that, in 
addition to following ‘international standards’, would facilitate future awareness 
of sea ice reduction by better displaying its variability (Kwong 2015). Still others 
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took a middle ground, asserting that although the new map likely was not of 
devious intent its production (and subsequent consumption) could not be 
separated from a broader political context. Illustrative here is an online 
comment on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s story on the new map, in 
which ‘Rickinedmonton’ acknowledged that although the map was not ‘some 
kind of right wing denialist conspiracy…some [climate change] deniers are prone 
to make disingenuous use of it’ (online comment in Kwong 2015).  
 
Insert figure 2 about here 
Insert figure 3 about here 
 
As is discussed below, much of the reason for the differences in the 
Norwegian and Canadian depictions of the sea ice edge, and the changes within 
each country’s depictions, stems from their use of different methodologies for 
defining and depicting the limits of sea ice. Not only did Norway and Canada use 
different definitions of ‘sea ice’ and different ways of aggregating the data to 
obtain identifiable, static ‘edges’ (limits), but the two countries each adjusted 
their methodologies over the time period in question. And of course the maps 
themselves are entirely different products, designed for different purposes:  
While the Norwegian map is a fairly technical object, designed to facilitate state 
planning, the Canadian map was developed for popular consumption, to impart a 
sense of the nation to Canadian and non-Canadian viewers.  
Thus, our aim here is not to compare the two maps or to highlight their 
different political or geophysical orientations and presumptions. In all their 
differences, they defy comparability. Rather, we are intrigued by their underlying 
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similarity. The two maps share a common concern with knowing and showing 
space by dividing it, in particular through the drawing of a singular boundary 
known as the ‘ice edge’, which in turn imparts a specific, Western politics of 
space. In our ‘nomospheric’ world (Delaney 2010), where spatial divisions 
support legal categorisations and legal systems support spatial ordering, 
boundary lines like the ice edge are ripe with political meaning, becoming not 
just boundaries but boundary objects, concepts that frame social understanding 
of the world (Star and Griesemer 1989) and that therefore set out ideas about 
possible futures. Thus, although we focus on the two 2015 maps and their 
antecedents, our objective is to move beyond them. Through a sustained 
examination of these two maps – their history, their reception, and their 
grounding in complex webs of state interests and presumptions about 
underlying geophysical and biogeographical processes – we seek to explore the 
challenges inherent when an ontology of fixed spaces is applied to an 
environment characterised by an exceptional level of spatio-temporal dynamism 
and material complexity and how efforts to address these challenges reflect and 
reproduce institutions of social power. 
 
Defining water, defining ice 
In our effort to understand the ice edge as a discursive construct with material 
effects, we turn to materialist theories of politics, in which contests over space 
are understood as occurring amidst the dynamic composition, decomposition, 
and agency of material nature (e.g. J. Bennett 2010; Coole & Frost 2010; Dittmer 
2014) and which suggest that designations of fixed categories of space must be 
contested. To turn to a few examples, the island, which seemingly can be 
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understood unproblematically as a body of land surrounded by water, has been 
found to defy definition, as island lifeways, ecologies, and political systems 
exceed the island’s borders (Mountz 2015; Royle 2001). Air similarly evades 
unitary definitions, as it is simultaneously medium, element, and atmosphere 
(Adey 2014). Ocean scholars note how the boundaries of the ocean exceed the 
limits of the shoreline (Spence 2014), and that the shoreline, which is purported 
to divide the planet’s surface into essential categories of land and sea, itself is 
typically a series of points of exchange rather than a boundary between two 
distinct spaces (Carter 1999). Furthermore, these points that unite as well as 
divide are themselves in constant motion due to changes in the volume of water 
and the displacement of land (Steinberg 2013). 
Sea ice is a similarly contested concept. At one level, it is clear what sea 
ice is: water of marine or oceanic origin that, because of temperature and 
pressure conditions, is encountered on the surface as solid. But this definition is 
complicated by numerous factors. The formal category ‘sea’ is itself defined by 
arbitrary boundaries: What is the threshold level of salinity (e.g. where does one 
draw the boundary between salt water and fresh water, and how does one 
classify liminal spaces such as estuaries and salt marshes)? Beyond salinity, what 
other properties, such as turbidity or the presence of marine microorganisms, 
are necessary to designate water as ‘sea water’? To what extent does sea water 
need to be permanently distinct from underlying soil to be defined as ‘sea’ (e.g. 
how does one classify intertidal zones or tidal pools)? 
Even if one can delimit the sea as a spatial unit, the designation of sea ice 
raises new questions. Sea ice comes in many forms, as sea ice glossaries 
produced by scientific institutions attest (e.g. Linder 2003; Canadian Ice Service 
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2016), and even these typologies ignore the rich knowledge of sea ice forms and 
processes held by Inuit and other indigenous northern peoples (e.g. Aporta 
2011; Carey et al. 2016; Inuit Circumpolar Council 2008; Krupnik et al. 2010). 
Defining sea ice is further complicated by methodological difficulties. Water that 
is essentially solid frequently has puddles of liquid on its surface, complicating 
efforts to use satellites to remotely sense the presence of ice from albedo 
reflectivity (Breivik et al. 2010; Howell et al. 2005). 
In addition, because sea ice occurs in various combinations with liquid 
sea water, fresh water, land, air, and other objects, even if one can define sea ice 
as a singular object it is not necessarily possible to define a zone of sea ice, let 
alone a distinct sea ice edge. And even if one is able to define a linear sea ice edge, 
mapping it poses challenges because it is rarely (if ever) static, moving with wind 
and ocean currents from hourly to seasonal time-scales, in addition to longer-
term trends in average seasonal positions associated with climate change. And 
finally, sea ice, even when formally defined, serves a range of functional 
properties. The same area of sea ice may be a hazard to a ship, a highway for a 
dog sled or snowmobile, and a place of refuge for a polar bear. Sea ice may 
simultaneously be a barrier to movement, a surface across which movement is 
facilitated, and an element, that, in its lateral drift, is movement (Peters 2015). 
Thus, the sea ice that is ‘mapped’ in one place may be significantly 
different – in form, function, permanence, and even in its elemental ‘iciness’ – 
from that mapped somewhere else. As Steinberg and Peters (2015, 260) note, 
‘The phenomenology of sea ice, as a particularly dynamic form of water, 
simultaneously destabilises conventional understandings of both geopolitics (as 
areal) and geophysics (as static), contributing to an ontological confusion that 
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underpins much of the ongoing debate over the Arctic’s future’. In its attempt to 
add stability and definition to a dynamic and indeterminate environment, the 
mapping of sea ice attempts to resolve this ‘ontological confusion’ through an 
alignment of law, cartography, and science. 
 
Defining ice zones and ice edges 
Although the concept of sea ice (or ice-covered ocean) occurs with some 
frequency in local law and state regulations, as well as making a brief appearance 
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Baker and 
Mooney 2012), there is no universally accepted standard for designating zones 
of sea ice. Some geoscientists use data based on observation of sea ice area (the 
number of pixels within an area of ocean with albedo reflectivity indicating 
frozen water) to make determinations about sea ice presence in a large area of 
ocean. However, the more commonly used statistic is sea ice extent, where data is 
aggregated to the level of the cell. The website of the US National Snow and Ice 
Data Center (NSIDC) helpfully likens the two measures to alternate ways of 
measuring a slice of Swiss cheese: “Extent would be a measure of the edges of the 
slice of cheese and all of the space inside it. Area would be the measure of where 
there is cheese only, not including the holes” (National Snow and Ice Data Center 
n.d.(b)). 
When measuring ice extent, cell size is conventionally set at 25 km2, so if 
one is using data from a satellite with 1m2 resolution there would be 625 pixels 
in a cell. A cell is then said to have ice extent if the percentage of pixels in the cell 
indicating ice (the ice concentration) exceeds a certain threshold. In this example, 
if one is using a 15% threshold then so long as at least 94 of the pixels in the cell 
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indicate ice the cell is declared to be an area of ice extent. If fewer than 94 
indicate ice (i.e. if the ice concentration is less than 15%) the cell is designated 
open water (Kvingedal 2005; National Snow and Ice Data Center n.d.(a)).  
While this seems straightforward, there is no evident basis, other than 
convention, for choosing a 25m2 cell as the standard unit of aggregation. 
Additionally, designations of ice extent are likely to change as improved satellite 
resolution increases the number of pixels in a cell. Perhaps most importantly, 
there is no standard for defining the ice concentration threshold used to 
distinguish ‘sea ice extent’ from ‘open water’. The Canadian Ice Service sets the 
threshold at 10%, the NSIDC (whose data is generally used in Norwegian maps) 
sets it at 15%, and others, as the NSIDC (n.d.(b)) notes, set the threshold as high 
as 30%. 
Variance in data resolution and definition of the sea ice extent threshold 
are matched by variance in time scale. Turning just to the three maps presented 
above, the 2003 Norwegian ice edge line (the green line on Figure 1) was based 
on data from a 23-year data-set, going back to 1967, when data first became 
available. Using this data, the map identified ice-covered areas as those where 
there was at least a 30% chance of ice occurring in April (the month identified in 
the report as having maximum ice extent), using the 15% NSIDC threshold. The 
2015 Norwegian line (the blue line on Figure 1) used an identical standard, 
except that the 23-year data-set was expanded to 30 years to align with the norm 
in climatological research. The 2006 Canadian map (Figure 3) indicated the ice 
edge at the ‘approximate limit of polar ice’. Subsequent discussion surrounding 
the 2015 map revealed that this referred to the September minimum but left it 
unclear whether data was derived from just the most recent year of observation, 
Page 9 of 45 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 10
the northernmost limit ever observed over an unspecified time-period, or a 
median of annual minimums observed over that unspecified time-period. The 
2015 Canadian map (Figure 2) clarifies that the limit is the minimum 
(September) extent, defining this as the median point over a 30-year data set of 
September observations.  
As critical geographic research on the Arctic has demonstrated, the 
shifting nature of Arctic sea ice, its liminal properties, and ambiguity in the 
divide between sea ice and open water have complicated both Arctic politics 
(Gerhardt et al. 2010; Strandsbjerg 2012) and the translation of Arctic science 
into policy and planning narratives (Kristoffersen 2014; Veland and Lynch 2016; 
Worms and Sörlin in press). Additionally, the failure of many to appreciate the 
connection between these binary narratives of Arctic ice and the complexities 
underlying Arctic livelihoods and scientific practices reflects the epistemological 
narrowness of much research on glaciers and sea ice (Carey et al. 2016). In this 
article, we build on these works, analysing the history of the Norwegian and 
Canadian ice edge mapping projects to extend insights on the role of maps, ice, 
and science as political actors that, through ordering space, order the world. 
 
Mapping a chaotic world 
Central to the story of ice edge mapping is, of course, the map. Almost thirty 
years after Brian Harley’s (1989) foundational work in critical cartography, one 
hardly needs to stress that a map is a partial depiction that, through 
simplification and erasures, performs political ‘work’. This perspective, however, 
has itself been critiqued by those who stress that a map’s power lies less in its 
existence as a (misleading) representational object and more in its power as a 
Page 10 of 45Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 11
more-than-representational actant that, through purporting to represent the 
world as a static, legible object, joins with other elements to shape that world. As 
networked relations emerge between the map, the reader, and the cartographer, 
new spaces and subjectivities are produced as individuals use the map to locate 
themselves in space (Conley 1996; Del Casino and Hanna 2006; Kitchin and 
Dodge 2007). At the same time, map users reproduce the authority of the map 
(and the authority of the institutions that produce the map) as well as the 
dominant statist and static ‘cartographic reason’ that conceptualises a world 
divided by visible and seemingly objective determinant lines (Pickles 2004). 
In this article, we focus less on the map as a force that constructs 
subjectivities and more on the map as an object that serves simultaneously as a 
tool for communicating power (through reference to implicit understandings of 
space) and an arena for contesting power. In part, this focus is mandated by a 
lack of ethnographic data on individuals encountering state-produced ice-edge 
maps. However it also is a choice taken in light of the rich genealogical history 
that accompanies a state-produced map: a history of legal reasoning, surveying, 
enabling legislation, and policy debates behind the map and the public 
discourses and practices that surround its reception. In addition, the role of the 
map in producing and communicating state knowledge of space is particularly 
prominent in the Arctic, in part because it is a region that many individuals 
(including some who have the power to shape the region) experience only 
through maps and other mediated forms of knowledge and in part because the 
actual environment there differs so significantly from these state officials’ 
personal experiences (Medby 2016; Steinberg et al. 2015; Strandsbjerg 2012). 
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Every state map works in tandem with a spatio-regulatory framework. 
For Arctic sea ice, a notable expression of this framework can be found in Article 
234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The only 
article in UNCLOS that acknowledges that sea water may have a frozen state. 
Article 234 states, in its entirety:  
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory 
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions 
and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create 
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the 
marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible 
disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall 
have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. 
(United Nations 1982) 
As Claudio Aporta (2011) has noted, Article 234 presents a one-dimensional 
view of sea ice, informed by Western maritime interests that perceive frozen 
water solely as a hazard to navigation. For indigenous people in regions 
characterised by sea ice, frozen water is not just an efficient transportation 
surface. It is also a living space that hosts everyday activities that span areas of 
land, sea, and inland water as well as sea ice. As a component of this wider 
assemblage of surfaces, sea ice is essential for preserving well-being, and sea ice 
processes and ecologies are incorporated into notions and practices of 
community, citizenship, and sovereignty (Bravo 2010; Hastrup 2016; Inuit 
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Circumpolar Council 2008; Kuptana 2013). For indigenous coastal peoples of the 
North, the primary concern is often not the presence of sea ice but its absence, 
and this leads to an entirely different perspective on remotely sensed ice 
imagery (Laidler et al. 2011). For instance, an Inuit hunter might set the ice 
extent threshold at 85% rather than 15%, reflecting a concern with ice-melt as a 
hazard. 
In addition to its singular focus on shipping, Article 234 is notable for its 
failure to define ‘ice-covered areas’, except tautologically as areas with ‘the 
presence of ice’. Much as the focus on commercial navigation forecloses 
perspectives on ice that might lead to different thresholds for determining ice 
extent, the binary category ‘presence of ice’ (in UNCLOS), or ‘ice extent’ (in 
scientific classificatory schemes), is insufficient for capturing the ways in which 
ice and the ice edge shift in time and space. 
In short, the binary division between ‘ice-covered areas’ and ‘open water’ 
is neither geophysically tenable nor operationally practical. Nor does it have any 
definitive legal clarity (Veland and Lynch 2016; see also, Baker and Mooney 
2012). Yet it has gone on to inform a range of regulatory structures, laws, 
political talking points, and national ideologies (as well as maps) across the polar 
North.  
Summing up these points, it appears to us that sea ice is a legal category 
constructed not so much by the freezing of sea water as by the mapping process 
that inscribes spaces (through visual and textual narratives) into fixed categories 
that obscure underlying ambiguities, transformations, and political agendas. The 
sea ice map is thus, after Latour (2007), a seemingly immutable (but actually 
quite mutable) mobile that purports to make sense out of a complex world by 
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assigning things to spatial categories and by carrying that knowledge into 
different contexts where it then can be reassembled and applied. 
Methodologically, this suggests that much can be learned from following the map, 
tracing its mutations as it is conceived, interpreted, and applied in specific 
contexts (the court room, the planning document, the atlas) to achieve spatial 
order among a community of users (Kitchin et al. 2013; Sparke 1998). By 
genealogically following the map, we explore not just its (mis)representations 
but also how cartographic reason is applied to construct spatial order. In the 
remainder of this article, we apply this approach to Norwegian and Canadian 
efforts at sea ice mapping, tracing the ways in which they have constructed the 
geo-legal category known as the ‘ice edge’. 
 
Mapping ice borders in Norway and Canada 
Norway 
The story of Norwegian ice edge mapping began with a 2001 civil disobedience 
action at Røst in the Lofoten Islands, where the oil industry had identified 
Norway’s most ‘prospective’ hydrocarbon deposit (KonKraft 2009) and where 
Norway’s partially state owned oil company Hydro (now merged with 2/3 
governmentally controlled Statoil) was preparing to engage in exploratory 
drilling. In response to opposition from local residents and environmentalists, 
and in anticipation of an election that was to occur in two months, the governing 
Labour Party withdrew Hydro’s discharge permit. A few months later, the new 
centre-right government stopped all petroleum activities in Arctic waters 
(except the only gas field in the Norwegian Arctic, ‘Snow White’) and asked 
research institutions and governmental directorates to provide assessment 
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reports on year-round off-shore petroleum activities in the North, with a specific 
mandate to produce maps that could be used to inform subsequent management 
plans. The principal report produced was The Identification of Particularly 
Valuable Areas in Lofoten – Barents Sea (Olsen and von Quillfeldt 2003)2, which 
went on to inform the Integrated Management of the Marine Environment of the 
Barents Sea and the Sea Areas off the Lofoten Islands (Ministry of the 
Environment 2006, revised in 2011) that was submitted to the Norwegian 
government and adopted by Parliament.  
 
Insert figure 4 about here 
 
While there is both a cartographic and policy continuity between the map 
in the original 2003 report (Figure 4), the maps in the 2006 and 2011 
management plans, and the 2015 map discussed at the beginning of this article 
(Figure 1), the map underwent a series of iterations that, we suggest, speaks to 
the ways in which Norwegian oil extraction policy has been advanced 
concomitantly with the reduction of sea ice to a static, binary, and 
cartographically comprehensible object. Importantly, although the ice edge is 
noted on the map, the accompanying report indicates that its significance 
emerges not because it is the southernmost point where water is frozen (i.e. the 
point at which ice extent meets open water) but because it is indicative of the 
location of the polar front. A close read of the text reveals that it is the polar front, 
the boundary between the cold polar air masses and the warmer mid-latitude air 
masses that is often broadly associated with the zone where warm southern 
water meets cold Arctic water, that is the zone of vulnerability: ‘The polar front 
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is the most important oceanographic phenomenon that creates enhanced 
biological production…[where] organisms at all levels of the food chain are 
concentrated’ (Olsen and von Quillfeldt 2003, 56). Furthermore, the report notes 
that when the warm and cold currents separate, during the spring and summer, 
the retreating ice creates a ‘stable, but relatively shallow surface layer’ which in 
turn leads to ‘intense production within a belt of 20 to 50 kilometers’ that 
‘follows the ice edge when it retreats northwards’ (Olsen and von Quillfeldt 2003, 
3).  
In other words, the significance of the ice edge emerges from its 
association with the increased biological productivity that occurs when the 
intersection of water masses, resulting from different air temperatures, induces 
mixing that facilitates the primary production of algae. This focus is consistent 
with the mandate given to the report’s authors, which was to evaluate areas 
where there were potential threats to ‘biological production and biodiversity’ 
(Olsen and von Quillfeldt 2003, 2). Significantly, the report attaches no 
environmental (i.e. biological) importance to the ice edge as an object, that is, a 
distinct line (or place) where ice becomes liquid. Rather, it is mapped (and 
subsequently emerges as a planning tool) only because it serves as an indicator 
of the approximate location of water temperatures associated with the polar 
front, which, in turn, is associated with heightened biological productivity. 
As the 2003 report (and its accompanying map) evolved into the 2006 
and 2011 reports (and their accompanying maps) a number of changes 
transpired. The text of the management plans continued to highlight the 
significance of the polar front. The 2006 management plan states, ‘Organisms at 
all levels of the food chain are concentrated along the narrow polar front. As a 
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result, any negative environmental factors that affect the polar front may have an 
impact on a substantial proportion of the populations of various species’ 
(Ministry of the Environment 2006, 33), and the 2011 management plan notes, 
‘[The polar front] is an area for various groups of organisms; it is also a natural 
and dynamic biogeographical boundary, and therefore supports relatively high 
biodiversity’ (Ministry of the Environment 2011, 26). However, the entire 
discussion is tempered by an acknowledgment that ‘there are significant gaps in 
our knowledge of physical and biological processes in the marginal ice zone, the 
polar front and other productive areas’ (Ministry of the Environment 2011, 29) 
and that due to this uncertainty the precautionary principle should apply when 
designing environmental management regulations for the marginal ice zone. 
This acknowledgment of uncertainty is extended from questions 
concerning physical and biological processes to geographic location. Referring to 
the eastern part of the zone, which previously had been disputed between 
Norway and Russia, the 2011 management plan notes, ‘The eastern part of the 
polar front is broader and less clearly defined than it is further west. Sea ice 
covers part of the previously disputed area for periods of the year’ (Ministry of 
the Environment 2011, 26). This would seem to suggest that in the eastern 
region in particular it would be problematic to let the ice edge simply serve as 
proxy for the polar front, and this was noted explicitly in a report issued by the 
Ministry of Climate and Environment (the successor to the Ministry of the 
Environment) that accompanied the 2015 map (Figure 1): ‘The sea ice’s 
southernmost reach often coincides with the polar front, but not always’ 
(Ministry of Climate and Environment 2015a, 24).  
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Amidst this recognition of uncertainty surrounding both the biological 
processes and the location of the polar front, sea ice – a tangible and seemingly 
identifiable substance – began to rise to the forefront as a spatial management 
tool. Whereas the initial 2003 map (Figure 4) and the text accompanying it 
(Olsen and von Quillfeldt 2003) highlighted the April and September ice edges as 
lines that needed to be identified for planning purposes, the map in the 2006 and 
2011 management plans (Figure 5) went on to highlight the entire area between 
the two ice edges as an ecologically significant ‘marginal ice zone’, a change that 
likely was made to reflect an increasing realisation among biologists that the 
relationship between marginal ice and biological productivity is characterized by 
a series of short-term bursts in productivity caused by melting or wind-driven 
events rather than by a stable or even seasonally predictable ice edge associated 
with the polar front (see Drinkwater and Tande 2014). This replacement of the 
ice edge as a distinct line (or a set of two lines) with a broader marginal ice zone, 
and its conceptual separation from the polar front is replicated in the 
accompanying text: ‘Both the polar front and the marginal ice zone have already 
been identified as particularly valuable and vulnerable areas in the management 
plan’ (Ministry of the Environment 2011, 26).  
 
Insert figure 5 about here 
 
While the conceptual separation of the ice edge (or the seasonal minimum 
and maximum ice edges, or the zone between them) from the polar front is 
scientifically justifiable, the successive cartographic and textual statements that 
distinguished one from the other set the stage for transforming the ice edge – 
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formerly a proxy for the shifting site of intense ocean-atmospheric energy 
exchange – into a singular object that, in turn, could become a planning tool. As 
we have seen over the twelve years between 2003 and 2015, the ‘ice edge’ was 
transformed from the area between the April and September limits, with various 
probabilities of ice within that zone (Figure 4, the 2003 map), to an 
undifferentiated zone of ‘marginal’ ice cover (Figure 5, the 2006/2011 map), to a 
single line representing the point at which there is a 30% chance of ice extent in 
April using a thirty-year data set and a 15% ice extent threshold (Figure 1, the 
2015 map). In the process, the ‘ice edge’ became a mappable line that could be 
joined by Prime Minister Solberg to the heft of ‘nature’ to justify the delineation 
of planning zones. As this occurred, the oceanic temperature variance and 
hypothesised biological productivity associated with the polar front, which was 
the reason why attention had been directed to the ice edge in the first place, 
quite literally disappeared from the map. 
Although the transformation of the ice edge from a complex set of 
probabilities and variances to a single line could theoretically have occurred 
independent of the cartographic disappearance of the polar front, the two 
reflected a common trend toward constructing the ice edge as an ontologically 
distinct object that could be deployed for spatial planning purposes. Once the ice 
edge was established as a distinct object – i.e. once it was transformed into a line 
that separated water from ice, and resilience from vulnerability - this line could 
be moved, opening up new sites for oil exploration. In short, over twelve years, 
the ice edge was transformed from an indeterminate, probability-driven, and 
substantively insignificant indicator of underlying ocean-atmospheric forces 
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associated with biological productivity and environmental vulnerability into a 
distinct object that could be used for planning purposes.  
But that is not the end of the story. Complicating the issue even further, 
there is yet another definition of the ice edge used by the Norwegian government. 
In its white paper New Possibilities for Northern Norway: The Opening of the 
Southeast Barents Sea for Petroleum Extraction, the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy (2012-2013) states, ‘In areas closer than 50 kilometers to the [annual] 
actual/observed ice edge, exploration drilling in oil-bearing layers will not be 
allowed, in the period between December 15th and June 15th’ (page 38, emphasis 
added). This definition contrasts with the ice edge depicted on the 2015 map, not 
least because it suggests that exploration drilling can take place much further 
north, at least in years where the ice edge happens to form at a relatively 
northern latitude.  
As of this writing, Norwegians remain divided over how to define the ice 
edge. The original 2003 map, which marked the April (maximum) and 
September (minimum) extents (Figure 4) has largely been abandoned. Likewise, 
the 2015 map that defined only the southernmost (April) extent, using the 
criteria of 30% likelihood over a thirty-year period (Figure 1), has been formally 
withdrawn amidst the ongoing controversy (Sættem and Tomter 2015). Most 
environmentalists and scientists call for the designation of a ‘marginal ice zone’ 
or ‘ice edge zone’ (Aarskog 2015), following the depiction used in the maps 
accompanying the 2006 and 2011 management plans (Figure 5). Since the 
controversy surrounding the 2015 map, the various sides have strengthened 
their positions. The Norwegian Polar Institute, which serves as both a 
government directorate and research centre on polar issues, is calling for a 
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definition that uses the maximum ice extent that has occurred during the past 
thirty years (in contrast with the 2015 map’s definition of 30% likelihood over 
that same time period) (Norwegian Polar Institute 2014, 8). This alternate 
standard, which would move the ice edge further southward, has been taken up 
by opposition parties in the Norwegian parliament as well as environmental 
activists. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy maintains its 
commitment to the ‘actual/observed ice edge’ in any given year, which would 
perhaps lead to the northernmost definition. Amidst all this debate, the polar 
front, which was closely linked to the mapping of the ice edge in the first place, 
has largely faded from public view, and the exploration licenses announced in 
2015 with the new ice edge map (Figure 1) have been granted.   
Canada 
Compared to the 2015 Norwegian map, the 2015 Canadian map has had a less 
contested history. Certainly its reception, as well as its political import, has been 
much more muted. Nonetheless, the decision to change the representation of the 
ice edge in the Canadian national atlas is no less intriguing. As in Norway, the 
Canadian map points to the arbitrary (and inherently political) nature of science, 
as scientists, policy-makers, cartographers, and the maps that they use to 
communicate with each other divide nature into categories, echoing a trend that 
has been identified in Arctic planning more generally (Worms and Sörlin in 
press). 
Maps have long had an important role in defining the scope – and identity 
– of the Canadian nation, pointing the nation northward, asserting Arctic waters 
as part of the national patrimony, and even implying a ‘natural’ extension of 
Canadian territory to the North Pole (M. Bennett et al. 2016; Steinberg 2010; 
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Steinberg et al. 2015; see also Grace 2007; Sparke 1998). This sentiment was 
echoed by Canada’s Minister of Natural Resources in the news release that 
accompanied the 2015 map: ‘Maps have played an important role in building our 
country…[and] this updated map will help Canadians better understand our 
evolving country’ (Natural Resources Canada 2015b). It was perhaps because of 
this context that, for a few days after the map’s release, the internet was abuzz 
with speculation about the reasons behind Canada’s decision to replace the old 
indicator of the ice edge – the poorly defined ‘limit of polar ice’ – with the 
‘median [September] sea ice extent’ figured over a thirty year period. In a 
manner reminiscent of the popular frenzy that occurred when a 2011 update of 
the Times Atlas of the World erroneously shrunk the Greenland Ice Sheet by 15% 
(Black 2011; Harvey 2011), the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation story 
reporting on the map (Kwong 2015) received 1,008 comments within days of 
publication, a level of attention not normally granted to something as mundane 
as a new edition of a national atlas.  
In fact, the decision to change the depiction of the ice edge in the Atlas of 
Canada intersects with an on-going debate within the Government of Canada 
concerning the delineation of sea ice and its use for purposes as diverse as 
asserting sovereignty, guarding against environmental hazards, and promoting 
transportation. Article 234 of UNCLOS, discussed above, was based on Canada’s 
1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), which, like Article 234, 
holds that the heightened dangers of ice-covered waters justify heightened 
coastal state regulation of navigation. While there certainly are legitimate 
reasons for exercising exceptional regulatory measures in Arctic navigation 
(both because of the hazard that sea ice and ice floes pose to ships and because 
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of the environmental dangers associated with a potential wreck), the designation 
of Arctic waters as ‘dangerous’, and therefore requiring a heightened level of 
policing, aligns with Canada’s desire to ‘perform sovereignty’ in the region 
(Dodds 2012).  
Much of Canada’s argument that Arctic waters are dangerous and 
therefore require heightened protection rely on their designation as ‘ice-
covered’, which, in turn, requires a binary, static definition of ice extent (as well 
as the designation of an ice edge where that ice extent ends) (Steinberg et al. 
2015). Designating these waters as ‘ice-covered’ and therefore ‘dangerous’ has 
the added benefit for Canada of implying that they are not suitable for reliable 
inter-ocean navigation, which supports Canada’s argument that the Northwest 
Passage is not an international strait and therefore should not be subject to 
UNCLOS’ international strait transit passage regime (Steinberg 2014). And finally, 
the designation of the waters of the Canadian archipelago as ice-covered 
supports Canada’s designation of both the land and the (frozen) water of the 
Canadian archipelago as essential Canadian space, an argument frequently made 
by Canadian officials with reference to winter movement of Inuit Canadians 
across land and frozen waters (Byers 2014; Gerhardt et al. 2010; Vannini et al. 
2009). 
Given the political significance of sea ice in Canadian politics, the 
scientists of the Canadian Ice Service, the agency within Environment and 
Climate Change Canada that monitors sea ice, are no more insulated politically 
than the Norwegian cartographers whose aggregation and representation of sea 
ice data determine where oil exploration can be permitted.  In the case of Canada, 
the ice extent threshold reported by the Ice Service has historically been 10%. 
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However, there is a history of controversy and debate concerning how the Ice 
Service reports ice extent, and this reflects contradictions in its mission to serve 
different branches of the Canadian government.  
During an interview with one of the authors of this article, a Canadian Ice 
Service official acknowledged that although the Ice Service’s primary mission is 
to support Transport Canada in managing the marine transportation system, the 
Ice Service also ‘support[s] DFAIT [the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, now Global Affairs Canada] in terms of their use of the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the ice-covered waters, Article 234’. The 
official went on to note that in 1985, when Canada extended the area covered by 
the AWPPA to 200 nautical miles (so that it would be coterminous with Canada’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone), the United States protested: ‘There were 156 faxes 
that went out: “Are you sure that it is really ice-covered up there for most of the 
year,” [the U.S. asked], because it is very open language’. More recently, Canada 
instituted NORDREG, a system of mandatory registration for ships entering 
Arctic waters. Again, Canada justified this heightened level of regulation because 
of the presence of hazardous ice, and again the U.S. protested what it saw as 
Canada using the presence of ice to exercise an excessive level of sovereign 
authority in its waters. According to the official, the Canadian Ice Service was 
once again called upon to verify the presence of ice, based on the 10% ice extent 
threshold: ‘We define it as 10% [in interpreting AWPPA and Article 234] and…. 
now it's the same question with NORDREG. [The U.S.] keeps coming back to us 
asking if it's really ice-covered up there’. 
At this point, a second Ice Service employee interjected to add historical 
perspective. In the process, he indirectly alluded to on-going tensions between 
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Transport Canada, DFAIT, and the Ice Service regarding the different ways that 
the three agencies measured and communicated ice extent: 
It's interesting because 20 years ago there was a discussion of the use of 
the term ‘ice-covered’. The decision was that we really shouldn't use the 
term ‘ice-covered’ to describe Canadian waters, [because] that's seen as a 
negative….[Other possible terms were] ‘ice-encumbered’, ‘ice-
infested’.  Now we are kind of retreating back to [saying] ‘they are 
definitely “ice-covered” most of the year’. [You can] see where the 
pressures have changed over the years. 
Left unstated was that the Inuit who actually live amidst these ‘ice-covered 
waters’ would have yet another perspective, one that emphasises that their 
Arctic home is constituted by connections rather than divisions between land, 
open water, and sea ice (Inuit Circumpolar Council 2009, Art. 1). Such a 
perspective would lead to different mappings projecting different politics and 
different understandings of space as the surfaces across which individuals move 
and construct their livelihoods (e.g. Pan-Inuit Trails n.d.). 
 
Conclusion: the politics of ice 
 
“The ice edge is lost. Those who find it, please deliver it to the address: longitude 
81. Knipowitsch.” 
-- Nikolai Knipowitsch, oceanographer (Sörlin and Lajus 2013, 75) 
 
“This is scientific dishonesty. Scientists need to maintain the position of their 
data and not move the border of the ice so that it fits into a political or economic 
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perspective. Scientists must maintain the premises of science and not listen to 
what politicians think is opportunistic to them.” 
-- Paul Wassmann, marine biologist (Norwegian News Agency 
2015b) 
 
We began this article with Prime Minister Solberg’s statement that ‘nature’ had 
moved the ice edge. At one level, this statement can be analysed for its 
conceptualisation of nature as a distinct, pre-social force whose actions can 
explain the condition of observable phenomena. Critical theorists of the nature-
society relationship have contested this view (e.g. Braun and Castree 2005), but 
even if one maintains that ‘nature’ exists as something distinct from the social 
world Solberg’s statement can be critiqued. One can note, for instance, that the 
‘nature’ identified by Solberg has been impacted by emissions from the carbon-
based economy that the policy change associated with the relocation of the ice 
edge is meant to facilitate.3  
In this article, however, we have focused less on the ‘nature’ that is 
ostensibly doing the moving and more on the ‘ice edge’ that is being moved. In 
order for the ice edge to be moved (by nature or by any other force), it must first 
be identified as an ontologically stable object, and the ice and open water that 
represent the two sides of this edge must similarly be identified as distinct 
elements. As we have shown, this is hardly the case. Although the ice edge has 
material effects, it is a construction that emerges from a fusion of science, law, 
policy, and cartography. In short, the ice edge is less a point (or series of points) 
in space – an ontologically stable foreground object that can be mapped against a 
metric background -- than it is a construction that defines space. And, if it defines 
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space, then what appears to be movement is really a moment of discursive 
reconstitution.  
Mobility is not the only property called into question once one removes 
the ice edge’s ontological stability. If the ice edge does not exist as a distinct 
object, can it ever be said to disappear? Can it go missing? These were the 
questions asked and implicitly answered in 1930 by Russian oceanographer 
Nikolai Knipowitsch when he sent his tongue-in-cheek telegram to colleagues. 
Noting that the ice edge was ‘lost’, Knipowitsch celebrated that he had correctly 
predicted that, due to higher temperatures and changes in the Gulf Stream, there 
would be an almost total absence of sea ice that summer in the Barents Sea.  
In a similar vein, one must ask: Once one has endowed the ice edge with 
the qualities of an object that can been seen, observed, moved, and used as a 
planning tool, what else can it do? Three days after Prime Minister Solberg’s 
remark about nature having ‘moved’ the ice edge, Norwegian television viewers 
learned that the ice edge can also generate satire and, in the process, become 
enlisted in a seemingly unrelated political controversy. On 23 January, one of the 
hosts of the Norwegian television program Nytt på Nytt fused the ice edge debate 
with an ongoing search for a Norwegian home for Kurdish Islamicist refugee 
Mullah Krekar. Mullah Krekar had recently been released from jail after serving a 
prison term for death threats towards Prime Minister Solberg. Sending him back 
to Iraq could well result in a death sentence, which would violate Norway’s 
human rights obligations. So, the Nytt på Nytt host satirically suggested that 
instead of sending Krekar to a remote Norwegian village where he could 
continue to organize his potential terrorist networks, he should be sent to the ice 
edge, where he would report several times a week on its exact location.  
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The irony here is that while it is absurd to imagine Mullah Krekar 
scientifically determining the precise location of the ice edge, such precision 
likewise cannot be obtained by the scientists of the Norwegian Polar Institute, 
the Canadian Ice Service, or any other institution. In the second quotation 
reprinted above, which was criticising Norwegian Polar Institute director Jan 
Gunnar Winther for his defence of the 2015 map, Tromsø-based biologist Paul 
Wassmann contends that ice edge research can and should rise above politics 
(see also, Krekling 2015). We have argued, however, that the very identification 
of the ice edge as a distinct boundary and the concomitant designation of sea ice 
as an object that has presence and significance, and that can therefore be used for 
spatial planning, is itself embedded in politics. Drawing on fieldwork with the 
indigenous peoples of northwestern Greenland, anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup 
(2016) has called ice ‘sociable’ (see also Bravo 2010). Similarly, from their 
research on glaciologists Carey et al. (2016) have designated ice as ‘gendered’. 
Our studies from Norway and Canada suggest that when ice is mapped by the 
state it is not only sociable and gendered; it is political.  
To conclude, we do not entirely reject the stories of the ice edge told by 
those who make and use maps that feature its depiction. The ice edge that was 
lost by Nikolai Knipowitsch and later found by Prime Minister Solberg had 
indeed been ‘moved’ by nature, even if, in the latter instance, nature had been 
assisted by anthropogenic climate change. Likewise, we do not question Denis 
Dubé’s assertion that the shift to the 30-year median on the new Canadian map is 
in fact a progressive change because it presents a better baseline that can be 
used for assessing future changes in Arctic sea ice and that ultimately can be 
used to provide a more critical perspective on climate change, its effects and, by 
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inference, its causes. However, so long as officials and activists – in Norway, 
Canada, and elsewhere – persist in efforts to map the unmappable, reducing the 
temporal and spatial complexity of ocean-atmospheric processes to singular 
representations, these maps, and the elements enrolled in the process of 
mapping, will take on a political significance that exceeds their specific 
signification about the geophysical properties of space.  
The solution is not necessarily to abandon the map as a planning tool. 
Numerous works in critical cartography have demonstrated how alternate 
knowledges, applied from perspectives other than the idealised Euclidean space 
of solid land and linear time, have led to different kinds of maps that have 
permitted different kinds of spatial planning, reflecting the politics and views of 
peoples (whether or not indigenous) who encounter space as fluid and dynamic 
(Sletto 2009; St Martin 2005). Rather, the histories of the Norwegian and 
Canadian ice edge maps, and the two countries’ broader histories of ice 
quantification, caution us to remain critical not just about where borders are 
mapped in complex environments but also about what is mapped at all.  
Due to its inherent variability and indeterminacy, it is impossible to 
achieve the kind of state-of-the-art scientific mapping of the ice edge proposed 
by Wassmann. Indeed, such a mapping may not even be desirable, as it would 
assign a false ontological stability to the socially constructed, arbitrarily 
delimited, and spatio-temporally variable states of solid ice and liquid water. 
However, so long as ice remains embroiled in the will to map, the ice edge will 
remain a potent player in the efforts of scientists and statespersons to write 
power to the world.   
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Endnotes 
 
1 All Norwegian-language quotations, including this one, have been translated by 
the authors. Government documents that were simultaneously released in 
Norwegian and English are noted as such in the reference list. In these instances, 
quotations are from the English language version. Norwegian language maps 
(Figures 1 and 4) are reproduced in original Norwegian because their main 
purpose in this article is to evidence Norwegian depictions of sea ice rather to 
aid readers in finding precise locations. 
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2 See also the summary provided to Parliament that integrated findings from the 
series of 2003 reports (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2003).  
 
3 In fact, in the report that accompanied the 2015 map, the Ministry of Climate 
and Environment (2015a, 26) noted that future ice-cover in the Barents Sea is 
critically dependent on the level of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Figure 1: Map released by the Government of Norway, January 2015, indicating previous and revised 
locations of the ice edge, as well as Norway’s Southeast Barents Sea Offshore Oil Province (Ministry of 
Climate and Environment 2015b). Reprinted with permission of the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and 
Environment.  
 
Translation of Norwegian text is as follows: Grey textbox: ‘Preliminary update of the management plan’s ice 
edge – The ice edge is defined as the boundary of the area where there is greater than 30% probability of 
sea ice in April. Ice data retrieved from National Snow and Ice Data Center (nsidc.org)’; Blue line: ‘Updated 
ice edge – Data for the 1984-2013 period’; Green line: ‘Original ice edge – Data for the 1968-1989 period’; 
White outline: ‘Areas open for petroleum activities’.  
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Figure 2: Detail from the national map in the 2015 edition of the Atlas of Canada, depicting the ‘Median Sea 
Ice Extent for September (1981-2010)’ (Natural Resources Canada 2015a). Reprinted courtesy of Open 
Government Licence - Canada.  
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Figure 3: Detail from the national map in the 2006 edition of the Atlas of Canada, depicting the 
‘Approximate Limit of Polar Ice’ (Natural Resources Canada 2006). Reprinted courtesy of Open Government 
Licence - Canada.  
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Figure 4: Figure from The Identification of Particularly Valuable Areas in Lofoten – Barentshavet (Olsen and 
von Quillfeldt 2003, 62). Reprinted with permission of the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research.  
 
The four  'especially valuable areas' that  crucial to supporting the region’s biodiversity are identified on the 
map with red hatching, from south to north: (1) Lofoten – Røst – Vesterålen, (2)  the Tromsø sheet 
(Tromsøflaket), (3) the Polar Front (Polarfronten), and (4) the September (minimum) and April (maximum) 
ice edges (Iskanten). Translation of Legend: 'Ice cover: >50% Summer; 30-50% Summer; >50% Winter; 
30-50% Winter; open water'.  
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Figure 5: Particularly valuable and vulnerable areas in the Barents Sea – Lofoten area (Ministry of the 
Environment 2011, 24). Reprinted with permission of the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment.  
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